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Abstract 
The securities market is the fundamental theo­
retical framework in economics and finance for 
resource allocation under uncertainty. Securi­
ties serve both to reallocate risk and to dissem­
inate probabilistic information. Complete securi­
ties markets-which contain one security for ev­
ery possible state of nature-support Pareto op­
timal allocations of risk. Complete markets suf­
fer from the same exponential dependence on the 
number of underlying events as do joint probabil­
ity distributions. We examine whether markets 
can be structured and "compacted" in the same 
manner as Bayesian network representations of 
joint distributions. We show that, if all agents' 
risk-neutral independencies agree with the inde­
pendencies encoded in the market structure, then 
the market is operationally complete: risk is still 
Pareto optimally allocated, yet the number of se­
curities can be exponentially smaller. For col­
lections of agents of a certain type, agreement 
on Markov independencies is sufficient to admit 
compact and operationally complete markets. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A large portion of the world's economic transactions in­
volve the exchange of risk. For example, insurance policy 
holders transfer some of their risks to insurance providers, 
in exchange for sure payments. Farmers hedge against the 
dangers of adverse weather by exchanging futures with less 
risk-averse speculators. Insurance contracts, futures, op­
tions, derivatives, and even stocks, serve to continuously 
reallocate risk around the globe. 
All of these potentially complex financial instruments can 
be modeled as portfolios of much simpler instruments, 
called securities. Securities are essentially lottery tickets: 
they pay off in some good (e.g., money) contingent on the 
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outcomes of uncertain events. A key result in the theory of 
economics under uncertainty is that, if agents have access 
to "enough" securities (i.e., access to a complete market), 
then equilibrium allocations of risk are Pareto optimal. Un­
fortunately, "enough" is, for all intents and purposes, too 
much: the number of required securities is equal to the size 
of the joint space of all relevant uncertain events, and is 
thus intractable in any realistic setting. 
The prospect of representing probabilities over joint event 
spaces was once viewed in much the same light­
theoretically ideal, but practically unachievable. The ad­
vent of graphical modeling languages, and in particular 
Bayesian networks (BNs), changed this view dramatically. 
These languages permit concise descriptions of otherwise 
unwieldy joint distributions, as long as sufficient condi­
tional independencies among events are present. In this 
paper, we demonstrate that, among certain populations of 
agents, conditional independence can be analogously ex­
ploited in the design and configuration of securities mar­
kets. 
Section 4 shows how securities markets can be structured 
according the the topology of any BN. As with BNs, if suf­
ficient independencies are encoded in the structure, the size 
of the market is exponentially reduced. Although struc­
tured markets are not complete in the traditional sense, we 
derive conditions under which they are nonetheless opera­
tionally complete, meaning that the equilibrium allocation 
of risk is still Pareto optimal. Section 5.1 gives a general 
sufficient condition: if, in equilibrium, all agents' risk­
neutral independencies agree with those encoded in the 
market's structure, then the market is operationally com­
plete. Section 5.2 characterizes the computational com­
plexity of pricing securities and finding arbitrage opportu­
nities in a structured market. Section 6 derives a special 
case when agreement on true independencies is sufficient 
to yield operationally complete markets; we also explain 
why agreement on true independencies is not sufficient in 
general. 
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2 BACKGROUND AND NOTATION 
We consider a model economy of N agents, indexed i = 
1, 2, ... , N, each with a subjective probability distribution 
Pr; over states of the world and a utility function u; for 
money. Denote the set of all possible states of the world 
as n = {WI, Wz, ... } . The w are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. 
State is often more concisely and naturally characterized 
as the set of outcomes of events. Denote the set of mod­
eled events as Z = { A1, Az, ... , AM}. Underlying M 
arbitrary events is a state space n of size IDI = 2M' consisting of all possible combinations of event outcomes. 
Conversely, any set of states can be factored into a set of 
M = flg IDil events. Without further assumption, the two 
representations are equivalent in both expressivity and size, 
although the event factorization may be more natural. In 
most of what follows, the events {Aj} are the focus of at­
tention, with n the implied joint outcome space. We refer 
to the { Aj} as the primary events, so as to distinguish them 
from the other 22M - M possible sets of states, each of 
which is also an event. 
2.1 DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
In general, an agent's utility is defined over the cross prod­
uct of available actions and possible states. We assume here 
that utility arises from an underlying utility for money. If 
agent i's utility for JL dollars is u(JL), then its utility U for a 
particular action a is its expected utility for money, 
U;(a) = E; [u; (riw))] = L Pr;(w)u; (riw)), (1) 
wEO 
where r;w) is agent i's wealth in dollars when action a is 
taken in state w (the dependence of r;w) on a is implicit). 
Agent i's decisions are made by maximizing expected util­
ity, or choosing the action a that maximizes (1). 
We assume throughout that utility increases monotonically 
with wealth. Local risk aversion at JL, denoted r;(JL), is 
defined as r;(JL) = -u�'(JL)/uHJL). Agent i is risk-averse 
if r;(JL) > 0 for all JL, or, equivalently, if u; is everywhere 
concave. Under this condition, the agent always prefers a 
guaranteed payment equal to the expected value of a lottery 
rather than the lottery itself, thus exhibiting an "aversion" 
to gambling. The agent is risk-neutral if r;(JL) = 0 for all 
JL, or u; is linear; in this case, maximizing (1) coincides 
with maximizing expected payoff. 
2.2 RISK-NEUTRAL PROBABILITY 
Notice that an outside observer 0, privy only to agent i's 
chosen actions, cannot uniquely discern either the agent's 
belief or its utility: the two quantities are inextricably 
linked (Kadane & Winkler, 1988). Any one of a continuous 
family of belief-utility pairs offers an equally valid ratio­
nalization for the agent's actions. That is, for any function 
f(w), subjective probabilities proportional to Pr;(w)f(w) 
matched with utilities u; ('riw)) /f(w) result in strategi­
cally equivalent utilities for actions U; (a). 
Risk-neutral probabilities are defined as 
Pr�N(w) ex Pr;(w)u� (riw)), (2) 
where u� is the derivative of utility (Nau, 1995). Agent 
i's observable behavior, manifested as actions, is in­
distinguishable from that of a hypothetical agent with 
transformed probabilities Pr�N (w) and reciprocally trans-
formed utility u�N(JL) = u;(JL)/u� (riw)). It turns out 
that the observer can uniquely assess agent i's risk-neutral 
probabilities. In fact, all standard elicitation procedures de­
signed to reveal agent i's beliefs based on monetary incen­
tives (de Finetti, 1974; Winkler & Murphy, 1968)-for ex­
ample, querying the prices at which the agent would buy 
or sell various lottery tickets-essentially reveal Pr�N, and 
not Pr; (Kadane & Winkler, 1988). The agent's observable 
beliefs are in effect its risk neutral probabilities, not its true 
probabilities. 
2.3 SECURITIES MARKETS FOR THE 
REALLOCATION OF RISK 
Under uncertainty, risk-averse agents will desire to hedge 
or insure against their risks by distributing wealth across 
states. For example, insuring the delivery of a package ef­
fectively transfers wealth from the package-received state 
to the package-lost state. The Arrow-Debreu securities 
market is the fundamental theoretical framework in eco­
nomics and finance for resource allocation under uncer­
tainty (Arrow, 1964; Dreze, 1987; Mas-Colell, Whinston, 
& Green, 1995). A security, denominated in money or 
other exchangeable good, pays off variously contingent 
upon the realization of an uncertain state. Let (A} denote 
a security that pays off one dollar if and only if the event 
A occurs. If the price of this security is p(A) per unit, then 
agent i's decision to purchase xiA) units is equivalent to 
accepting a lottery with payoff (1- p(A))xlA) if A occurs, 
and -p(A)XlA) otherwise. Positive xiA) indicates a quan­
tity to buy, and negative x;A) a quantity to sell. 
In a market of S such securities, let p 
(p(1) ,p(2), • • •  ,p(8)) denote the securities' prices, 
and x; = (x;1), x?), ... , x;s)} denote the quantities of the 
securities held by agent i. Agent i's utility for securities is 
its expected utility for money (1), where the agent's choice 
of actions is how much to buy or sell of each security. 
Agents trade securities with each other prior to revelation 
of the world state. In an economy of N agents, each con­
tinually maximizing (1), prices adjust until all buy orders 
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match with sell orders for all securities. A market is in 
competitive equilibrium at prices p if and only if 
N 
:Lxi(P) = 0, (3) 
i=l 
where xi(P) is agent i's optimal demand vector at prices 
p. 
A securities market is termed complete if it contains at least 
lr!l-1 linearly independent securities. Such a market guar­
antees, under classical assumptions, that equilibrium en­
tails a Pareto optimal, or efficient, allocation of risk. 
A conditional security (A1IA2) pays off contingent on A1 
and conditional on A2. That is, if A2 occurs, then it pays 
out exactly as (A1); on the other hand, if A2 occurs, then 
the bet is called off and any price paid for the security is re­
funded (de Finetti, 1974). The canonical complete market 
consists of one security paying out in each state of nature. 
In general, though, any set of securities (possibly including 
conditionals) with a payoff-by-state matrix of rank If! I - 1 
is complete. 
When one unit of each security pays out one dollar, the 
equilibrium prices in a securities market form a coherent 
probability distribution. For example, p(A,) = p(A1A2) + 
p(A1A2); or p(A,A2) = p(A,IA2)p(A2). In fact, the equi-
librium prices coincide with the agents' risk-neutral prob­
abilities (2) for the available securities, which must be 
in complete agreement (Dreze, 1987; Nau & McCardle, 
1991). Derived formally in Section 3.1, we simply sketch 
the intuition here. Since a risk-neutral agent buys (Aj) 
if p(Aj) < Pri(Aj) (it simply maximizes expected pay­
off), then any agent buys (Aj) if p(Aj) < Pr�N(Aj)· 
Similarly, the agent sells if p(Ai) > Pr�N(Aj). If two 
agents h and i have differing risk neutral probabilities­
that is, Pr�N(Aj) "f:. Pr�N(Aj)-then there is an inter­
mediate price at which they are both willing to trade. It 
follows that, at equilibrium, when by definition opportu­
nities for exchange have been exhausted, all agents' risk 
neutral probabilities agree across available securities. Fur­
thermore, since offers to buy and sell must match, the equi­
librium prices equal these consensus probabilities. 
There are two, largely inseparable, reasons for agents to 
trade in securities: to insure against risk ("hedge") and to 
profit from perceived mispricings ("speculate"). The more 
averse to risk, the more the former consideration dom­
inates an agent's decision making. On the other hand, 
risk-neutrality-the limit of diminishing risk aversion-is 
synonymous with pure speculation. These two behaviors 
are aligned with the two central roles of securities mar­
kets in the theory of economics under uncertainty. The 
first, as mentioned, is to support the reallocation of risk. 
The second is to aggregate and disseminate information. 
Agents that disagree on the likelihood of states may seek 
to exchange securities at prices that yield, according to 
each's subjective viewpoint, an increase in expected re­
turns. Moreover, each agent is privy, albeit implicitly, to the 
evidence gathered by other agents (perhaps at great cost) 
via fluctuations in price. 
2.4 BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
A joint probability distribution can often be represented 
more compactly as a Bayesian network (BN), or other 
graphical model (Darroch, Lauritzen, & Speed, 1980). 
Conciseness is achieved by exploiting conditional indepen­
dence among the primary events. Let CI[Aj, W, X] be 
shorthand for Pr(AjiWX) = Pr(AjiW ), indicating that 
Aj is conditionally independent of the set of events X, 
given another set W .  Consider the event Ak E Z, with 
predecessors pred(Aj) = {A1, A2, ... , Ak-d· Suppose 
that, given the outcomes of a subset pa(Ak) � pred(Ak) 
of its predecessors-called Ak 's parents-the event Ak is 
conditionally independent of all other preceding events, or 
CI[Ak, pa(Ak), pred(Ak)- pa(Ak)]. This structure can 
be depicted graphically as a directed acyclic graph (DAG): 
each event is a node in the graph, and there is a directed 
edge from node Ai to node Ak if and only if Aj is a parent 
of Ak. We also refer to Ak as the child of Aj. A DAG 
has no directed cycles and thus defines a partial order over 
its vertices. We assume without loss of generality that the 
event indices are consistent with this partial ordering; in 
other words, if Aj is a predecessor of Ak then j < k. 
We can write the joint probability distribution in a (usually) 
more compact form: 
M 
Pr(A1A2 ···AM)= IT Pr(Aklpa(Ak)) .  
k=l 
For each event Ak, we record a conditional probability ta­
ble (CPT), which contains probabilities Pr(Aklpa(Ak)) 
for all possible combinations of outcomes of events in 
pa( Ak). Thus, it is possible to implicitly represent the 
full joint with 0 (M · 2max{q(k)}) probabilities, instead of 
2M- 1, where q(k) = lpa(Ak)l is the number of parents 
of Ak. 
A Markov independence is a special type of conditional in­
dependence (Darroch et al., 1980; Pearl, 1988; Whittaker, 
1990). The node Aj and the set of nodes X � Z - Aj are 
Markov independent, given another set W � Z -X - Aj, 
if CI[Aj, W, X] and Aj U W U X = Z. Recall that Z is 
the set of all modeled events. 
A DAG is an independency map, or an /-map, of a proba­
bility distribution Pr if every independency implicit in the 
graph holds within Pr (Pearl, 1988). Note that a complete 
graph is a trivial 1-map of any distribution over n. 
A DAG is decomposable if there is an edge between every 
two nodes that share a common child (Chyu, 1991; Dar­
roch et al., 1980; Pearl, 1988; Shachter, Andersen, & Poh, 
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1991). Trees are a subset of decomposableDAGs, since ev­
ery node has at most one parent. Complete graphs are also 
decomposable since every two nodes are connected. Any 
BN can be made decomposable by reorienting some edges 
and introducing new edges where needed (Chyu, 1991; 
Shachter et al., 1991). Though the decomposable repre­
sentation can be exponentially larger than the original BN, 
it can still be exponentially more compact than the full joint 
distribution. The independencies encoded in a decompos­
able BN are all Markov independencies (Pearl, 1988). 
3 EQUILIBRIUM IN A SECURITIES 
MARKET 
3.1 EQUILIBRIUM AS CONSENSUS 
The standard formulation of competitive equilibrium (3) is 
as a fixed point where each agent's demand is optimal at 
current prices, and each security's price balances aggregate 
demand. In this section, we examine an alternative charac­
terization of equilibrium, recognized first by Dreze (1987). 
Agent i's first-order condition for x�j) is: 
where T�w) == L:k (1wEAk-
p(k)) x�k) is its payoff in 
state w, and 1wEAk is the indicator function that equals one 
if w E Ak, and zero otherwise. Applying the chain rule 
L Pri(w) ( 1wEA; - p(j)) u� ( r;
w> ) = 0 
wEll 
L Pri(w)u� ( r;
w>) 
wE A; 
-p(j) L Pri(w)u� (r�w>) = 0, 
wEn 
and solving for pU>, we find that: 
. L:wEA; Pri(w)u� (r;
w>) 
P(J) = 
( 
= Pr�N(Aj)· 
:L:wEnPri(w)u� Y�
w)) 
(4) 
In words, equilibrium can also be considered a fixed point 
where exchanges among agents induce a consensus on risk­
neutral probabilities across available securities, and where 
the security prices themselves match these agreed-upon 
values. 
3.2 COMPLETE MARKETS, COMPLETE 
CONSENSUS, AND PARETO OPTIMALITY 
As described in Section 2.3, a securities market is com­
plete when S == 101- 1 and all securities are linearly inde­
pendent. In such a market, equilibrium allocations of risk 
are Pareto optimal: any gamble, contingent on any event 
E � n, that is an acceptable purchase for one agent is not 
an acceptable sale for any other (Arrow, 1964). 
A probability distribution over n has dimensionality IOI-1 
(normalized likelihoods for the 101 states). Prices of se­
curities in a complete market constitute 101 - 1 linearly 
independent equations for these 101 - 1 unknowns, and 
thus define unique probabilities for all states w E 0, also 
called the state prices (Huang & Litzenberger, 1988; Var­
ian, 1987). Denote these probabilities as Pr0(w), and let 
Pro(E) = L:wEE Pro(w) be the price-probability of any 
event E, perhaps not directly corresponding to an available 
security. 
The agents' risk-neutrai distributions also have dimension­
ality 101 - 1, subject to the S constraints defined by (4). 
If the market is complete, it follows that Pr�N is uniquely 
determined, and equals Pr0 for all i. That is, a complete 
market induces a compete consensus on risk-neutral proba­
bilities. This suggests an intuitive explanation of why equi­
librium allocations are Pareto optimal. All agents behave as 
if they are risk-neutral (payoff-maximizing) with identical 
beliefs. In such a situation, there are simply no differences 
of risk-preference or opinion on which to trade. 
If S < 101 - 1, then the consensus on risk-neutral prob­
abilities is generally incomplete. Whenever Pr�N ( w) -:j; 
Pr�N (w) for any w, there exists an acceptable exchange 
between agents h and i, though perhaps not supported by 
the S available securities. An equilibrium allocation in an 
incomplete market is not necessarily Pareto optimal. 1 But it 
can be, depending on the particular belief structures of the 
agents. Call a market operationally complete if its compet­
itive equilibrium (x, p) is Pareto optimal (with respect to 
the agents involved), even if the market contains less than 
101-1 securities. As a degenerate example, an empty mar­
ket is operationally complete for an economy of completely 
identical agents. Although such a market does not support 
all conceivable trades, it does support all acceptable trades 
among the given agents. 
4 STRUCTURED MARKETS: AN 
ANALOGY TO BAYESIAN 
NETWORKS 
Achieving completeness is, practically speaking, all but im­
possible; the required number of securities--exponential in 
the number of primary events-is simply too huge. 
In attempting to represent probability distributions over 0, 
researchers in uncertain reasoning are faced with an anal­
ogous combinatorial explosion. The typical solution is to 
work with the factored event space, rather than the state 
1 Allocations are always efficient with respect to available se­
curities, but not necessarily with respect to all states. 
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space, and to exploit any independencies among events us­
ing graphical models. 
Continuing the analogy, securities markets can be struc­
tured according to the directed acyclic graph D of any BN. 
Simply introduce one conditional security (Aj lpa(Aj)) for 
every conditional probability Pr(Aj lpa(Aj)) in the net­
work. For each event Aj with q(j) = lpa(Aj)l parents, 
this adds 2q(j) securities, one for each possible combina­
tion of outcomes of events in pa( Ai). Call such a market 
D-structured. Imagine for the moment that D is fully con­
nected (that is, no independencies are represented). Then 
aD-structured market contains "LJ:1 2i-l = 2M - 1 = 
lf21 - 1 linearly independent securities, and is thus com­
plete. 
The benefit of a BN representation, and likewise a struc­
tured market, obtains when D is less than fully connected, 
and thus the market contains less than lf21 - 1 securities. 
What can be said in this case? Certainly, depending on 
the beliefs and utilities of the agents, inefficient allocations 
are possible. Nonetheless, under circumstances explored 
below, the smaller market may suffice for operational com­
pleteness. 
5 COMPACT MARKETS I 
5.1 CONSENSUS ON RISK-NEUTRAL 
INDEPENDENCIES 
Call a D-structured market a risk-neutral independency 
market, or an RNI-market, if, in equilibrium, D is an 1-map 
of Pr�N for all agents i. That is, all agents' risk-neutral 
distributions agree with the independencies encoded in 
the market's structure. Paralleling our notation for true 
conditional independence, let CI�N [ Ai, W, X] denote the 
risk-neutral conditional independence Pr�N (Ai IW X) 
Pr�N (Aj IW). 
Proposition 1 At equilibrium in an RNI-market, 
Pr�N (w) Pr�N (w) for all agents h, i and all states 
W E  f2. 
Proof. The market contains "'M 2q(j) securities, UJ=l 
imposing an equal number of constraints on every 
agent's risk-neutral distribution via ( 4 ). For each 
event, 1-mapness further imposes 2q(j) (2i-l-q(j) -
1) conditional independence constraints of the form 
CI�N[Aj,pa(Aj),pred(Aj)- pa(Aj)], for all combina­
tions of outcomes of events in pa( Aj) and all but one com­
bination of outcomes of events in pred(Ai)-pa(Aj) (the 
remaining one is implied by the others). Then every agent's 
risk-neutral distribution is subject to 
M 
2::: 2q(j) + 2q(j) (2j-l-q(j) - 1) 
j=l 
M 
= L 2j-l = 2M - 1 = lf21 - 1 
j=l 
identical, linearly independent constraints. Therefore 
Pr�N = Pr�N for all h, i. 0 
In an RNI-market, define the state prices Pr0(w) = 
Pr�N(w) as the unique probabilities over n that are con­
sistent with the prices of available securities and the inde­
pendencies of D. The following corollary establishes that 
equilibrium prices for any of the lf21 - 1 - S "missing" 
securities are also derivable from Pr0• 
Corollary 2 Let (p(l), . .. ,p<5)) be the equilibrium prices 
in an RNI-market. Introduce a new security (E). Then 
(p(l), ... ,p(S), Pr0(E)) are equilibrium prices in the ex­
panded market. 
Proof. Before the extra security is introduced, all agents' 
risk-neutral probabilities Pr�N (E) already equal Pr0(E), 
without buying or selling any quantity of the security. It 
follows that, with the additional security, the equilibrium 
condition (4) is satisfied with xiE) = 0 for all i, p(E) 
Pro (E), and all other prices unchanged. 0 
The number of secunties in an RNI-market, 
0 ( M · 2max{ q(j)}), can be exponentially smaller than 
the 2M - 1 required for traditional completeness. The 
following corollary shows that the more compact market 
supports allocations that are equally efficient. 
Corollary 3 Every RNI-market is operationally complete. 
That is, the equilibrium allocations x and state prices Pro 
in an RNI-market constitute an equilibrium in a (truly) 
complete market composed of the same agents. 
Proof. By repeated application of Corollary 2, we can add 
the lf21 - 1 - S securities necessary to complete the mar­
ket.Z For each new security, a price consistent with Pr0, 
coupled with zero demand from all agents, satisfies (4). All 
complete markets, regardless of structure, support the same 
equilibrium allocations and state prices (Huang & Litzen­
berger, 1988; Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Varian, 1987). 0 
Proposition 1 and its corollaries are equilibrium results 
only. We sketch here one possible procedure for reaching 
agreement on the market structure.3 Begin with securities 
in only the M events: (A1) , ... , (AM). If any agent's de­
mand for (Ak IAj) (for any j < k) at price p(Ak) is nonzero, 
then it creates a new market in (Ak IAj). If, at some future 
2A natural set to add are the "L�12q(j)(2i-l-q(j)- 1) se­
curities of the form (Ai lpred(Aj ) ) , for all events Ai, all com­
binations of outcomes ofpa(Aj ), and all but one combination of 
outcomes ofpred(Aj)-pa(Aj). 3This procedure is similar to Geiger's (1990) protocol for elic­
iting independence structures from experts. 
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time, the agent has zero demand for its new security, then it 
may retract the security. An additional condition for equi­
librium is that no agent desires to create or withdraw any 
markets. Then, in equilibrium, it should be the case that all 
agents' risk-neutral independencies agree with the market 
structure, and that the market is operationally complete. We 
might want to add a transaction cost for opening new mar­
kets, so that equilibrium only ensures that risks are hedged 
up to a threshold cost. 
5.2 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF 
ARBITRAGE 
Imagine that, after equilibrium is reached in an 
RNI-market, a redundant security is introduced, say (AM). 
The equilibrium price of (AM) is already determined 
(Corollary 2): it must equal Pr0(AM) = Pr�N (AM). Fur­
thermore, if the current price does not equal Pr0(AM ), then 
the market is not in equilibrium, and arbitrage is possible. 
For example, if p(AM} < Pr0(AM), then an outside ob­
server 0 could purchase it at the going price and sell it 
to any of the agents at price p* such that p(AM} < p* < 
Pr�N (AM) = Pr0(AM ). Although 0 does not have di­
rect access to Pr0(AM ), it is uniquely computable given 
the other prices and the independence structure of D. 
If 0 can find an arbitrage opportunity by correctly pricing 
the redundant security, then 0 can perform Bayesian infer­
ence, which is #P-complete (Cooper, 1990). 
6 COMPACT MARKETS II: CONSENSUS 
ON TRUE INDEPENDENCIES 
Equilibrium agreement on risk-neutral independencies may 
seem a somewhat strange condition, especially considering 
that the Pr�N are changing as transactions occur. Some 
authors argue that, since agents appear to act according 
to Pr�N and standard elicitation techniques reveal Pr�N, 
risk-neutral probabilities are in fact no less "real" than 
true probabilities (Kadane & Winkler, 1988; Nau & Mc­
Cardle, 1991). However, while it seems reasonable that 
agents would have true independencies in common (Pearl, 
1993; Smith, 1990), it is harder to justify why their risk­
neutral independencies would coincide. This section de­
velops a theory of compact markets based on consensus 
on true independencies. If, despite any quantitative differ­
ences between Pri and Pr�N, an agent's true independen­
cies were always manifest as risk-neutral independencies, 
then results concerning RNI-markets would carry over un­
changed. Section 6.1 demonstrates that this is indeed the 
case for a subclass of agents and a subset of independen­
cies. Section 6.2 discusses how known limitations of belief 
aggregation procedures restrict the possibility of obtaining 
compact markets under more general circumstances. 
6.1 CONSENSUS ON MARKOV 
INDEPENDENCIES 
A commonly assumed risk-averse utility form is exponen­
tial utility: ui(!-l) = -e-c•I-L. This utility form is synony­
mous with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), where 
Ci is agent i 's coefficient of risk aversion, or 1/ ci its risk tol­
erance. As the agent's wealth increases, its marginal utility 
for unit dollars decreases (since it is risk-averse), but the 
amount of its aversion to risk remains constant at Ci. 
In this section, we show that, in economies composed of 
agents with CARA, markets structured according to agreed 
upon (true) Markov independencies are operationally com­
plete. Define an independency market, or an /-market, as 
aD-structured market such that D is an 1-map of Pri for 
all agents i (i.e., all agents' true distributions agree with the 
independencies in D). An !-market is decomposable if D is 
decomposable-every node's parents are fully connected. 
Let Z = {A1, ... , AM} be the set of all events, Aj E Z a 
particular event, and W � Z - Aj and X = Z - W - Aj 
subsets of events. We are interested in whether agent i's 
Markov independencies Cii[Aj, W,X] are reflected as a 
risk -neutral independencies CI�N [ Aj, W, X], and are thus 
observable. For brevity, we drop the subscript i when only 
one agent is under consideration. 
Proposition 4 
where the second precondition must hold for all possible 
joint outcomes of the events in W, and all pairs (X, X) of 
different joint outcomes of events in X. 
Proof. 
ul ('y(AjWX) ) 
-
ul (y(AjWX)) 
ul(y(AjWX)) - u1 (y(AjWX)) 
_ ul (y(AjW X)) 
Pr(AjW) + Pr(AjW) u1(y(Aiwx)) 
_ 
_ ul (y<AjWX)) 
- Pr(AjW) + Pr(AjW) ul (y<Aiwx>) 
P•(AjW)P•(WX) 1(y(A·WX)) p,(w) u ' 
P•(AjW)P•(WX) 1(y(A·WX)) P•(AjW)P•(WX) 1 (y(A·WX)) P•(W) U J + P•(W) U 3 
P•(AjW)P•(WX) 1 (y(A·WX)) 
P.(W) U 3 
- P•(Ajw>P.cwx> I (r<A -wx>) p,(Aiw>P.cwx> I (r<A·wx>) P•(W) u 3 + P•(W) u 3 
Pr(Aj WX)u1 (Y(AjWX) )+Pr(Aj W X)u1 (y<Aiw X)) 
_ 
Pr(AjWX)u1 (y<Aiwx>) 
- Pr(AjWX)u1 (y<Aiwx))+Pr(AjWX)u1 (y<Aiwx>) 
PrRN(AjWX) _ PrRN(A-WX) 
PrRN(AjWX)+PrRN(AjWX) - PrRN(AjWX)+PrRN(...fjWX) 
PrRN(AjiWX) = PrRN(AjiWX) 
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The second precondition in (5) says that the ratio of marg­
inal utility in states where A1 does not occur to margi­
nal utility in states where A1 does occur cannot depend 
of the outcomes of events in X. This is true (and in­
deed PrRN = Pr) if the agent's marginal utility u' is con­
stant across states. This holds if the agent is risk neutral, 
and holds approximately if utility is state-independent and 
y(wi) � y(wk). But this approximation is not realistic for 
an agent engaged in trading securities, since a central role 
of the market is precisely to enable the transfer of wealth 
across states. 
Let y(Ai W) be the agent's payoff from all securities that 
depend only the outcomes of events in A1 U W. Exam­
ples are (A1), (A1 W), and (A1 I W), which return the same 
dollar amount regardless of the realizations of events in 
X = Z - W - A1. Similarly, let y(w X) be the payoff 
from securities that do not depend on A1. 
Suppose that the agent exhibits CARA, and that its pay­
offs are separable according to y(AjWX) = y(AjW) + 
y(WX) - y(W). Separability essentially means that any 
of the agent's securities (or prior stakes) whose payoff de­
pends on A1 cannot also depend on events in X. In this 
case, 
u' ('r(AjWX)) 
-
u' (y(AjW)+y(WX)_y(W)) 
u'(Y(AjW�)) u'(Y(AjW)+y(WX)_y(W)) 
ce-cT(AjW) e-cT(WX) ecT(W) 
ce-cT(�jW) e-cT(WX) ecT(W) 
-
ce-cT(AjW) e-cT(WX) ecT(W) 
-cT(AjW) -cT(WX) cT(W) ce 
_ 
e 
_ e _ _ 
-
u'(y(AjW)+y(WX)_y(W))
-
u'(y(AjWX)) 
u'(Y(AjW)+y(WX)_y(W)) u'(y(AjWX)) 
Thus the constraint on utility in (5) is satisfied, and any 
Markov independencies are observable. 
We are now in a position to derive the main result of this 
section. 
Proposition 5 When all agents have CARA, every decom­
posable !-market is an RNI-market. 
Proof. Let Wj be the set of direct parents and direct chil­
dren of event A1, and X1 all other events. From decompos­
ability and 1-mapness, we can infer that 
I. CI; [A1, Wi, Xi J for all agents i and events j, 
2. none of the securities (A1 lpa(Aj)) that are contingent 
on A1 depend on x1, and 
3. none of the securities (Ak lpa(Ak)) such that Aj E 
pa(Ak) that are conditional on Aj depend on Xj. 
Items 2 and 3 ensure separability of payoffs from the 
available securities (we assume that any prior stakes 
are also separable). Then, invoking Proposition 4, 
CI�N[A1, w1,X1] for all agents i and events j. As a re­
sult, D is an 1-map of every Pr�N regardless of allocations 
or prices, including those at equilibrium. 0 
Proposition I and Corollaries 2 and 3 are immediately ap­
plicable. In particular, for agents with CARA, every de­
composable !-market is operationally complete. 
6.2 INHERENT LIMITATIONS 
One might wonder whether compact !-markets are possi­
ble for larger classes of agents or independencies. It can 
be shown via counterexample that, even when all agents 
have CARA, a market conforming to agreed-upon (possi­
bly non-Markov) independencies will not always be oper­
ationally complete. Moreover, when all agents have log­
arithmic utility for money (another commonly assumed 
utility form), even a market conforming to agreed-upon 
Markov independencies will not always be operationally 
complete. 
Although we do not have a formal statement of impos­
sibility, results from statistical belief aggregation suggest 
that agreement on true independencies will not be suffi­
cient in general to yield compact and operationally com­
plete markets. The state prices Pro in a securities market 
are a function of all the agents' beliefs (and their utilities), 
and as such essentially constitute a measure of aggregate 
belief. Many researchers have studied belief aggregation 
functions (Genest & Zidek, I986), and several impossibil­
ity theorems severely restrict the class of functions that pre­
serve unanimously held independencies (Genest & Wagner, 
1987), even when restricted to independencies among the 
primary events (Pennock & Wellman, 1999). The aggre­
gation "function" of a securities market is of course sub­
ject to the same limitations. We suspect that, for many 
configurations of agents, markets structured according to 
unanimously-held true independencies will not yield prov­
ably optimal allocations of risk. Nevertheless, it may well 
be the case that structured markets can yield approximately 
optimal allocations over a wider range of agent popula­
tions. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Rational risk-averse agents will seek ways to mitigate the 
dangers inherent in an uncertain world by reducing their 
exposure to risk. Whenever two agents exhibit divergent 
tolerances for risk (e.g., an insurance company and a home­
owner), or disagree on the likelihood of world outcomes 
(e.g., a bettor on St. Louis to win Super Bowl XXXIV and 
a bettor on Tennessee), there may be an opportunity for 
an exchange of state-contingent wealth--essentially a port­
folio of securities-that both agents deem beneficial. To 
guarantee that all desirable exchanges of risk are supported, 
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a market must be complete, or contain at least 2M - 1 lin­
early independent securities, where M is the number of rel­
evant uncertain events. Clearly, this number of securities is 
prohibitive in even modestly complex domains. 
In this paper, we showed that the same principles used to 
succinctly represent joint probability distributions can aid 
in reducing the required number of securities. We illus­
trated how markets can be structured analogously to Bayes­
ian networks. We derived two conditions under which com­
pact markets-in some cases with exponentially fewer se­
curities than complete markets--can still support all desir­
able exchanges of risk. The most general condition is that 
all agents' risk-neutral independencies agree with the inde­
pendencies encoded in the market's structure. For popula­
tions of agents with constant absolute risk aversion, agree­
ment on Markov independencies is sufficient. 
We plan to evaluate empirically whether structured markets 
can yield efficiency gains even when agents do not meet all 
of these theoretical sufficiency requirements. As a poten­
tial future application, one might imagine structuring a set 
of derivatives so as to increase opportunities for agents to 
hedge their risks, while at the same time keeping the num­
ber of financial instruments required at a minimum. 
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